Kur’an-ı Kerim indirildiği günden bugüne hem muhtevası hem de üslubuyla gerek inananların gerekse inanmayanların hep ilgisini çekmiştir. Bu ilgi zamanla onun başka dillere tercümesini beraberinde getirmiştir. Bu tercüme faaliyetleri aynı şekilde hem Müslümanlar hem de Gayr-i Müslimler tarafından yapılmıştır. Kur’an-ı Kerim’in kendine has ve tarih boyunca benzerinin getirilemediği eşsiz bir üslubu vardır. Onun üslubunun eşsiz olması aynı zamanda başka dillere tercümesini de zorlaştırmaktadır. Ancak Kur’an hitabının tüm insanlara yönelik olması onun başka dillere tercümesini de zorunlu kılmıştır. Bugüne kadar farklı dillere (...) yapılmış Kur’an tercümelerinin sayısı yüzü aşmıştır. Bu tercümelerin her birinin Kur’an’ı doğru anlamaya katkı sunmak iddiası, tercümelerde takip edilen yöntemi de belirlemiştir. Bu yöntemlerden en çok tercih edileni hiç kuşkusuz anlamın tercümesi yöntemidir. Bu yöntemin yanı sıra harfi harfine tercüme de başvurulan yöntemlerden bir tanesidir. Merhum Muhammed Hamidullah’ın Fransızca’ya yaptığı Le Saint Coran adlı tercüme bir Müslüman âlim tarafından yapılmış ilk harfi harfine tercüme örneğidir. Muhammed Hamidullah’ın Doğu ve Batıyı bilen ve çok çeşitli alanlara hâkim bir ilim adamı olması yaptığı bu tercümeyi dikkate değer kılmıştır. Bunun yanı sıra daha başka özellikleri ile de dikkat çeken bu Fransızca çeviri Aziz Kur’an: Çeviri ve Açıklama şeklinde Türkçeye tercüme edilmiştir. Bu çalışmada, Türkiye’de hatırı sayılır derecede bir okuyucu kitlesine sahip olan Hamidullah’ın, Türkçeye aktarılmış bu tercümesi değerlendirilecektir. (shrink)

Carrying out analyses performed on the provisions of “Pre-Islamic Divine Laws”, which is described as the religious provisions introduced by the prophets before Prophet Muhammad is one of the questions of debate in Shafiī Sect. The reason laying out of this controversy is based on the question, whether the provisions enunciated via the prophets before the Prophet Muhammad are recognized within the legal aspect, or not. On the other hand, there is no controversy between the procedural, on non-binding for Muslims, (...) about of the previous divine communiqués, which are not mentioned in the Qur’ānor the sunnah, and previous divine messages with evidence that they were abolished despite their presence in these two sources. In the same way, there is no debate about the fact that the provisions of the previous divine religions that were in force for Muslims, such as fasting, also remained in force for Muslims. In this case, with taking part in the Qur’ān or the sunnah, the provisions that there is no evidence about whether they abolished or not, it is debated that they are for Muslims binding or not.In this study, our objective is to carry out analyses and researches on the methodological conceptions of Imam Shafiī and Shafiī lawmen with regards to Pre-Islamic Divine Laws, which have no evidence for being retained in force or being abolished for Muslims despite being mentioned in the Qur’ān or the sunnah, as well as on the level of theoretical conceptions of these scribes being put into practice within the scope of fiqh examples.SummaryIt is a must to identify the scope of Pre-Islamic Divine Laws (Sharia Man Qablanā) [shariah of those before us], which is discussed in terms of being recognized as a shariah evidence by the Shafiī lawmen before analzying the opinions of Shafiī Sect followers. Yet, setting forth the opinions in a healthy manner is based on the identification of the question of debate. Within this context, it is a must to draw up the lines and borders in what the Shafiī lawmen / lawyer and canonists / judiciary mean by the term “Pre-Islamic Divine Laws (Sharia Man Qablanā)” in order to designate the practical results of methodological discussions on Pre-Islamic Divine Laws.Sharia Man Qablanā, of which lexical meaning is “shariah of those before us” is defined in fiqh as follows: “These are the religious provisions acquainted by the prophets before Prophet Muhammad”. In fact, this definition can be categorized as “general” in terms of the evidential value of Sharia Man Qablanā. In that, since it is not possible to carry out an analysis on the reliability of the informational value in the previous divine notices, which cannot be conferred neither in the Holy Qur’ān and the sunnah, each and every lawmen and canonists, including those recognizing Sharia Man Qablanā as hujjat (proof), have come to an agreement that the early divine notices that are not mentioned in the Holy Qur’ān and sunnah will not be recognized in terms of its informational value for Muslims, thus being besides the mark to discuss its validity and bindingness. In this case, the outlines of Sharia Man Qablanā, as controversial in terms of its hujjat value, must be specified. Belonging the earlier divine religions as per the works of lawmen, Sharia Man Qablanā is subjected to a categorization of four part with regard to provisions mentioned in the Holy Qur’ān or the sunnah, whether they are recognized as hujjat by Muslims. 1. The provisions that are not mentioned in the Holy Qur’ān or the sunnah, yet being mentioned only in the earlier monotheistic revelations. The fiqh lawmen have come to an agreement that these provisions are not binding for Muslims, and even that it is not permissible to act in accordance with these provisions. Because, there is no certain information on whether these provisions are reliable.2. The earlier divine notices, which have been proven to be nullified for Muslims, despite being mentioned in the Holy Qur’ān or the sunnah. Since these divine notices have lost their validity, there is a consensus among Muslims that they are not recognized as hujjat. The following hadith is shown as an example as of from the sunnah for this part “Pillage was not halal to those before me, but not it is halal to me” (Muslim, “Masājid”, 56). In that, this hadith indicates that prohibition with regards to the pillage, which was not permissible to the earlier ummahs (nations), is not recognized by Muslims. Thus, rendering pillage as not halal cannot be attributed to Muslims. 3. The provisions of earlier divine religions, which remained in force about Muslims. The canonists exemplify this matter with “fasting”. It can be understood from the verse “O ye who believe! Fasting is prescribed to you as it was prescribed to those before you, that ye may (learn) self-restraint.” (al-Baqara 2/183) that the fasting was a provision as prescribed for the earlier ummahs, which remained in force for Muslims as well. There is no controversy on the matter that fasting is prescribed for Muslims too, as it can be clearly seen from the verse. The hadith of the Prophet Muhammad “It (sacrificing an animal for God) is the sunnah from your Ancestor Ibrahim” (Ibn Majah, “Adāhi”, 3) can be shown as an example that sacrificing an animal for god is applicable to Muslims as well. As a matter of fact, this hadith attests that sacrificing an animal for god is applicable to Muslims, as it is in the religion of the Prophet Ibrahim. 4. The provisions from earlier divine religions, which have no evidence whether they were revoked or remaimed in force for Muslims. The canonists cannot find any evidence for the provisions with regards to the alternative utilization of something between the partners to be recognized as applicable for Muslims within the scope of the following verses: “Here is a she-camel: she has a right of watering, and ye have a right of watering, (severally) on a day appointed” (al-Shu‘ara 26/155) and “And tell them that the water is to be divided between them: Each one's right to drink being brought forward (by suitable turns)” (al-Qamar 54/28). Similarly, there is no evidence that the provisions concerning the retailation, as prescribed in Torah, whether they remained in force or were revoked, as it can be seen in the verse “We ordained therein for them: "Life for life, eye for eye, nose or nose, ear for ear, tooth for tooth, and wounds equal for equal” (al-Ma’ida 5/45). (shrink)

İslam hukuk doktrininde bir fiilin veya sözün hükmünü belirleme noktasında kasıt esas alınır. Kasıt; hukuki işlemlerden elde edilmek istenen neticedir. Bununla birlikte mükellefin söz veya fiillerinin kasıt sonucu meydana gelmesi halinde söz ve fiillerine hüküm bağlanır. Bu takdirde bir akdin esasını onunla elde edilmek istenen hukuki neticeye yöneltilmiş olan tarafların kastı teşkil eder. İslam dini mükelleflerden bir davranışı ortaya koyduğu zaman bunun bilinçli olarak yapılmasını ve o işe kalben yönelmesini istemiştir. Dini emir ve yasakların tamamı bir maksadı gerçekleştirmek için vazedilmiştir. (...) Şari’in emir ve yasaklardaki maksadı da ya kulların maslahatını temin etmek yada onlardan bir mefsedeti gidermektir. Mükelleften istenen de bu maksat doğrultusunda hareket etmesi ve Şari’in maksadından başka bir şeyi kastetmemesidir. Hukuki tasarrufların geçerli olması noktasında bütün mezheplerin kasta önem verdikleri görülmektedir. (shrink)

Suppose we grant that evolutionary forces have had a profound effect on the contours of our normative judgments and intuitions. Can we conclude anything from this about the correct metaethical theory? I argue that, for the most part, we cannot. Focusing my attention on Sharon Street’s justly famous argument that the evolutionary origins of our normative judgments and intuitions cause insuperable epistemological difficulties for a metaethical view she calls "normative realism," I argue that there are two largely independent lines of (...) argument in Street’s work which need to be teased apart. The first of these involves a genuine appeal to evolutionary considerations, but it can fairly easily be met by her opponents. The second line of argument is more troubling; it raises a significant problem, one of the most difficult in all of philosophy, namely how to justify our reliance on our most basic cognitive faculties without relying on those same faculties in a question-begging manner. However, evolutionary considerations add little to this old problem, and rejecting normative realism is not a way to solve it. (shrink)

I argue—contra moderate grounding pluralists such as Kit Fine and more extreme grounding pluralists such as Jessica Wilson—that there is fundamentally only one grounding/in-virtue-of relation. I also argue that this single relation is indispensable for normative theorizing—that we can’t make sense of, for example, the debate over consequentialism without it. It follows from what I argue that there is no metaethically-pure normative ethics.

When it comes to epistemic normativity, should we take the good to be prior to the right? That is, should we ground facts about what we ought and ought not believe on a given occasion in facts about the value of being in certain cognitive states (such as, for example, the value of having true beliefs)? The overwhelming answer among contemporary epistemologists is “Yes, we should.” This essay argues to the contrary. Just as taking the good to be prior to (...) the right in ethics often leads one to sanction implausible trade-offs when determining what an agent should do, so too, this essay argues, taking the good to be prior to the right in epistemology leads one to sanction implausible trade-offs when determining what a subject should believe. Epistemic value—and, by extension, epistemic goals—are not the explanatory foundation upon which all other normative notions in epistemology rest. (shrink)

The linchpin of Williamson (2000)'s radically externalist epistemological program is an argument for the claim that no non-trivial condition is luminous—that no non-trivial condition is such that whenever it obtains, one is in a position to know that it obtains. I argue that Williamson's anti-luminosity argument succeeds only if one assumes that, even in the limit of ideal reflection, the obtaining of the condition in question and one's beliefs about that condition can be radically disjoint from one another. However, no (...) self-respecting defender of the luminosity of the mental would ever make such an assumption. Thus Williamson can only secure his controversial claims in epistemology by taking for granted certain equally controversial claims in the philosophy of mind. What emerges is that the best bet for defending an internalist epistemology against Williamson's attack is to take there to be a tight, intimate connection between (to take one example) our experiences and our beliefs upon reflection about the obtaining of those experiences, or between (to take another example) the rationality of our beliefs and our beliefs upon reflection about the rationality of those beliefs. (shrink)

It has been claimed that the recent wave of neuroscientific research into the physiological underpinnings of our moral intuitions has normative implications. In particular, it has been claimed that this research discredits our deontological intuitions about cases, without discrediting our consequentialist intuitions about cases. In this paper I demur. I argue that such attempts to extract normative conclusions from neuroscientific research face a fundamental dilemma: either they focus on the emotional or evolved nature of the psychological processes underlying deontological intuitions, (...) in which case the arguments rely on a blatantly fallacious inference, or they appeal to the (alleged) moral irrelevance of the factors to which deontological intuitions respond, in which case the neuroscientific results end up playing no role in the overall argument. (shrink)

A quasi-sequel to "Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions." Covers some of the same ground, but also extends the basic argument in an important way.

Quasi-realists aim to account for many of the trappings of metanormative realism within an expressivist framework. Chief among these is the realist way of responding to the Euthyphro dilemma: quasi-realists want to join realists in being able to say, "It’s not the case that kicking dogs is wrong because we disapprove of it. Rather, we disapprove of kicking dogs because it’s wrong." However, the standard quasi-realist way of explaining what we are up to when we assert the first of these (...) two sentences rests on a mistaken identification of metaphysical dependence (or grounding) with counterfactual covariation. This chapter proposes a better way for expressivists to understand such sentences, on which they serve to express complex states of mind in which an attitude bears a relation of psychological dependence (or basing) to another state of mind. It is argued that this proposal is a natural, versatile, and fruitful approach for expressivists to take that helps them secure the first half of the Euthyphro contrast—but at the cost of making it difficult to see how expressivists can make sense of that contrast’s second half. (shrink)

Are there practical reasons for and against belief? For example, do the practical benefits to oneself or others of holding a certain belief count in favor of that belief? I argue "No." My argument involves considering how practical reasons for belief, if there were such things, would combine with other reasons for belief in order to determine all-things-considered verdicts, especially in cases involving equally balanced reasons of either a practical or an epistemic sort.

Moral properties are explained by other properties. And moral principles tell us about moral properties. How are these two ideas related? In particular, is the truth of a given moral principle part of what explains why a given action has a given moral property? I argue “No.” If moral principles are merely concerned with the extension of moral properties across all possible worlds, then they cannot be partial explainers of facts about the instantiation of those properties, since in general necessitation (...) does not suffice for explanation. And if moral principles are themselves about what explains the moral properties under their purview, then by their own lights they are not needed in order to explain those moral properties’ instantiation—unless, that is, the principles exhibit an objectionable form of metaphysical circularity. So moral principles cannot explain why individual actions have moral properties. Nor, I also argue, can they explain why certain other factors explain why those actions have the moral properties that they do, or in some other way govern or mediate such first-order explanations of particular moral facts. When it comes to the explanation of an individual action’s specific moral features, moral principles are explanatorily idle. (shrink)

I argue that Alvin Goldman has failed to save process reliabilism from my critique in earlier work of consequentialist or teleological epistemic theories. First, Goldman misconstrues the nature of my challenge: two of the cases he discusses I never claimed to be counterexamples to process reliabilism. Second, Goldman’s reply to the type of case I actually claimed to be a counterexample to process reliabilism is unsuccessful. He proposes a variety of responses, but all of them either feature an implausible restriction (...) on process types, or fail to rule out cases with the sort of structure that generates the worry, or both. (shrink)

Guilt and fear today have developed an unexpected quality: they contribute powerfully to the survival of humanity. The feeling of guilt proceeds from an elementary awareness: although the unequaled progress of science and technology in the twentieth century has undoubtedly ameliorated the conditions of human life, it also has given rise to an infernal logic of genocide and crimes against humanity, in which almost all nations, directly or indirectly, have participated and participate still. This awareness is joined to another, which (...) is itself accompanied by a primordial fear: for the first time in history, science and technology have endowed humanity with the power to destroy itself and the planet, without furnishing humans with the means of escaping their destined role as sorcerer's apprentice, for no science can tell us what to do with science. It is this double feeling of guilt and fear that pushes contemporary man to search feverishly for ethical foundations capable of furnishing discreet regulatory principles to underpin decisions and actions. From the point of view of contemporary humanity, ethics must be able to confer meaning and perspective on an existence which apparently has neither: “Now,” writes Hans Jonas, “we shiver in the nakedness of nihilism in which near-omnipotence is paired with near-emptiness, greatest capacity with knowing least for what ends to use it.”. (shrink)

Ten years ago, an issue of the journal L'Homme et la Société was entitled “La Mode des identités.” Most of the articles were about cultural identity, but the basic thrust of the work was “a critique of the ‘fashion’ of identity calling into question the validity of a notion as striking as it is uncertain.” Recently, a special issue of the journal Sciences Humaines, entitled “Identité et identités,” dealt with personal, familial, social, professional identities and only spoke of cultural identity (...) marginally and in a roundabout way. Finally, in a manual of Sociologie politique published by the Presses Universitaires de France, the author takes to task the notion of ethnicity inherent to cultural identity and pushes the critique of the ethnic group to the point of negating its objective existence. Must we think then that the notion of cultural identity is henceforth obsolete, that it has lost all pertinence? (shrink)

18. yüzyıl Aydınlanma felsefesinin Romantik filozofu Jean Jacques Rousseau pek çok çalışmaya konu olmuştur. Bu çalışmada Rousseau’nun özellikle başta “Bilimler ve Sanatlar Üstüne Söylev” adlı çalışması esas alınarak onun bilim ve sanatlara bakışı ele alınmıştır. Rousseau, söz konusu eserinde ele aldığı bilim ve sanat hakkındaki düşünceleri nedeniyle çok kez eleştirilmiştir. Bu çalışmanın amacı Rousseau’nun bilim ve sanata karşı olduğu yönündeki bir eleştiriyi tartışmaya açmaktır. Çalışma, Rousseau’ya yöneltilen eleştirilere karşı suçlamalara nasıl tepki verdiğini bizzat onun eserlerinden yola çıkarak ortaya koymayı amaçlamaktadır. (...) Rousseau’nun derdi uygarlık neticesinde inşa edilen toplumda, insanların değerlerinin nasıl yitip gittiğini göstermektir. Nitekim Rousseau, özgür ve eşit doğan insanların böylesi bir toplumda “her yerde zincire vurulduğunu” ifade eder. O, bu durumun sorumluları olarak gördüğü sahte aydınları ve bilginleri eleştirmektedir. Zira Rousseau, bu kişilerin bilim ve sanat adı altında yaptıkları çalışmaları insanlara tuzak olduğu için eleştirmektedir. Çünkü ona göre, uygarlık durumu, insanı gerçek doğasından ve doğal olan yanından uzaklaştırmakta ve değersizleşmektedir. (shrink)

BackgroundIn terms of ethical decision making, every clinical case, when seen as an ethical problem, may be analyzed by means of four topics: medical indications, patient preferences, quality of life, contextual features. The aim of this study was to compare the performance of 4th year dental students on Ethical Decision Making before and after a course on ethics.MethodsFourth year dental students from academic year 2013–2014 participated in the study. A 3-h lecture, which was about four topics approach to clinical ethical (...) case analysis, was given to the students. The lecture was based on case scenarios related with dental ethics. After the completion of lectures,a case scenario was presented to the students to assess their ethical decision making abilities. At the end of the exam, four topics and ethical judgment were evaluated. Their performances on this examination were evaluated before and after lectures. Statistical evaluation was performed with the significance level set at p 0.05). The mean total score of the students after the course was significantly higher than before course.ConclusionMore lectures should be implemented to the curriculum to increase the student awareness of ethical issues and to reach the ultimate goals of dental education. (shrink)

Once upon a time, coherentism was the dominant response to the regress problem in epistemology, but in recent decades the view has fallen into disrepute: now almost everyone is a foundationalist (with a few infinitists sprinkled here and there). In this paper, I sketch a new way of thinking about coherentism, and show how it avoids many of the problems often thought fatal for the view, including the isolation objection, worries over circularity, and concerns that the concept of coherence is (...) too vague or metaphorical for serious theoretical use. The key to my approach is to take a familiar tool from discussions of the regress problem -- namely, directed graphs depicting the support relations between beliefs -- and to use that tool in a more sophisticated manner than it is standardly employed. (shrink)

Moral particularists argue that because reasons for action are irreducibly context-dependent, the traditional quest in ethics for true and exceptionless moral principles is hopelessly misguided. In making this claim, particularists assume a general framework according to which reasons are the ground floor normative units undergirding all other normative properties and relations. They then argue that there is no cashing out in finite terms either (i) when a given non-normative feature gives rise to a reason for or against action, or (ii) (...) how the reasons that are present in a given context play off each other to determine one’s overall duties. However, the conjunction of these two theses leaves particularists without a coherent notion of a reason for action: posit too much irreducible context-dependence in the behavior of reasons, and the reasons-based framework breaks down. One upshot is that the particularists’ challenge to principle-based approaches to ethics has not, at present, been successfully made out; another upshot is that perhaps the best way to formulate that challenge involves renouncing the reasons-based framework all together. (shrink)

After summarizing the essential details of Anil Gupta’s account of perceptual justification in his book _Empiricism and Experience_, I argue for three claims: (1) Gupta’s proposal is closer to rationalism than advertised; (2) there is a major lacuna in Gupta’s account of how convergence in light of experience yields absolute entitlements to form beliefs; and (3) Gupta has not adequately explained how ordinary courses of experience can lead to convergence on a commonsense view of the world.

In this paper, we propose some transfor mations based on the centroid points between single valued neutrosophic numbers. We introduce these trans formations according to truth, indeterminacy and falsity value of single valued neutrosophic numbers. We propose a new similarity measure based on falsity value between single valued neutrosophic sets. Then we prove some properties on new similarity measure based on falsity value between falsity value between single valued neutrosophic sets. Furthermore, we propose similarity measure based on falsity value between (...) single valued neutrosophic sets based on the centroid points of transformed single valued neutrosophic numbers. We also apply the proposed similarity measure between single valued neutrosophic sets to deal with pattern recognition problems. (shrink)

Un nouveau discours politique prétend restaurer le peuple dans sa dignité en s’attaquant aux timides réformes multiculturalistes de ces dernières années. Une nouvelle séparation sociale est revendiquée en termes ethnoculturels, notamment dans le domaine scolaire, pour faire réapparaître les distances sociales qui ne peuvent plus être parlées en termes de classes.

Hristiyan teolog William Lane Crag'a ait din ve bilim arasındaki ilişkiyi ele lan bir çeviri...

This study aimes to examine the basic codes of Manichaeism thought and to discuss whether the thoughts of Manichaeism followers disappeared after they were erased from the earth. In our research, religious phenomenology and comparative method were used in traces of the uninterrupted tradition of wisdom. In the study, an effort has been made to capture the traces of Manichaeism in later religions and thoughts by revealing the framework of the thought mechanism of Manichaeism, and thus, to draw attention to (...) the timeless flow and theme of the wisdom tradition. Some examples from the pre-Islamic and post-Islamic periods are presented in order to prove the thesis that Manichaeism continues its existence with its messages. In this discussion, I addressed that deep gnostic thoughts were not understood by the masses focused on reward and punishment, nor were they appreciated by the exoteric clergy. The study pointed out that esoteric thoughts were eliminated with the support of governments that derive their power from the masses. Afterwards, gnostic thoughts such as Manichaeism and Illuminationism were evaluated as the internal dynamics of the literature of hostility to matter, which disregards worldly life and even leads to extinction, preparing for their own end. The following common theme is underlined in the relationship established between Manichaeism and later gnostic or gnostic thoughts: The human soul, which is a piece of light, has fallen from the world of lights located in a supreme place to the lower material world and material human body, which has a demonic origin, and has fallen into forgetfulness, fainting, amnesia or heedlessness there, and has been awakened by gnostic messages or revelations sent by savior messengers, after this awakening, he embarked on a spiritual journey with eschatic practices and asceticism, and eventually reunited with his homeland and united with the source of light. While the Manichaean system of thought also has important commonalities with the spiritual gnosis, which became more evident in the post-Islamic periods and stands out with its opposition to matter, it broke away from the Zoroastrian thought, which sees matter as the perfect form of creation, and it also was noticed that it was the opposite the existential gnosis system of Islam, which sees matter as a manifestation and mirror of the creator. As a result, the study suggested that Manichaeism was nourished by previous religious traditions such as Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, and Christianity, proudly expressed this unity and closeness as an heir of eternal wisdom, and continued its existence through later religious and intellectual traditions, including Islam. Again, although it has no followers today, I concluded that Manichaeism continues to exist within the later religious thoughts with its gnostic messages, continues its effects under the guise of various mystical groups until today, and in the final analysis, the spirit and theme of eternal wisdom beyond time and space can continue to exist even if its followers disappear. (shrink)

This paper argues that Kant’s distinction between “civil union” and “ethical community” can be of great value in dealing with a problem that causes considerable trouble in contemporary political and social philosophy, namely the question of the normative significance and role of religion in political and social life. The first part dwells upon the third part of Kant`s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason with the intention of exposing the general features of ethical community. It highlights the fact that (...) Kant considers publicity, and indeed public authority, to be constitutive of the ethical community. The second part discusses his argument that we have a unique ethical duty to enter into an ethical community. This discussion clarifies the constitutive purpose of ethical community and sets forth why Kant thought that the ethical community should have a religious form. The third part presents an account of the constitutive purpose of the state in light of the Doctrine of Right. Throughout these steps, as is concluded, the essentials of a model for the relations between law, ethics, and religion emerge, which shows the way in which both religious and secularist worries can be met on a principled basis. (shrink)

This study aimed to examine the thoughts and expectations of patients receiving healthcare from their physicians and evaluate the ethical aspects of these thoughts and expectations. To determine the ethical aspects of the thoughts and expectations of patients, an open-ended question was asked on the web page of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) Health Care Command, which is accessible to the users of the TAF intranet system (the internet system used within TAF institutions). The participants were asked to express their (...) thoughts in their own words. A total of 804 participants answered the question by providing their input. The statements of the participants were classified separately by two public health specialists. The classification was made in accordance with the basic principles of patient rights, and they were collected under various headings including expectations about respect and care, good communication, informed consent, and fair and non-privileged distribution of healthcare services. The results show that patients tend to consider the physicians they see as solely responsible for all the negative issues that they encounter during their healthcare. This indicates that there is a need for extensive research on the underlying factors involved in the negative thoughts and feelings toward healthcare professionals in both TAF and Turkey in general. (shrink)

One of the important aspects of the classical kalām is that the philosophical topics related to physics and cosmology, namely daqīq or laṭīf al-kalām, have an important place in it. The reason for the involvement of the kalām scholars (mutakallimūn) in these kinds of issues is commonly regarded as an effort to defend Islamic beliefs against other religions and thought systems. However, when their studies are examined closely, the complexity of their concepts and theories, as well as the fact that (...) they discussed these matters not only with opposing groups but also among themselves, show that kalām had a much deeper and integrated relationship with science and philosophy in the classical period. Their engagement with philosophical and scientific matters, such body (jism), substance/atom (jawhar), accident (ʿaraḍ), motion, space, time, and causality dates back to the mid-8th century and displays great diversity. Although the mutakallimūn probably were the first ones to deal with physics-related issues in Islamic thought, it cannot be said that they are given the importance they deserve in modern studies pertaining to the history of science and philosophy in Islamic thought. The fact that, in kalām works, physics-related questions were generally discussed along with theological matters has caused the scholarship of mutakallimūn to be regarded as an adjunct of apologetic discipline and has thereby led to a limited description of kalām’s relationship with science and philosophy in the classical period. This set of circumstances hinders a proper understanding of how science and philosophy emerged and evolved in Islamic thought. In the present article, I will attempt to present the place and role of physical topics, namely daqīq or laṭīf al-kalām, in classical kalām, between the 9th and 11th centuries. Firstly, I will show how the classical mutakallimūn divided kalām into two parts, namely ‘major’ (jalīl) matters, which are based on revelation, and ‘subtle’ (daqīq) or ‘obscure’ (laṭīf) matters, which mainly depend on reason. Matters surrounding jalīl al-kalām indicate the theological problems on which the mutakallimūn had a general agreement, such as God’s oneness, revelation, prophethood, and eschatology. Questions discussed under the category of daqīq or laṭīf al-kalām mostly correspond to philosophical and scientific issues concerning epistemology, physics, and cosmology. Secondly, I will examine to what extent the mutakallimūn dealt with physical sciences and what kind of topics were primarily discussed in the field of daqīq or laṭīf al-kalām. The upshot of this will be that the claim that the mutakallimūn were interested in physics and cosmology merely for apologetic purposes is unsound; rather, in the 9th and 10th centuries, many Muslim theologians also concerned themselves with issues such as motion, void, body, and causality as truth seekers. That being the case, the mutakallimūn should be taken into consideration in studies related to the emergence and rise of science and philosophy in Islamic thought. (shrink)

In this study, Qāḍī Abd al-Jābbār’s views on knowing Allah (ma‘rifatullah) and following issues have been analysed. In this context, either the divine message has reached to a person or not, it is examined whether ma‘rifatullah is obligatory (wajib) upon him. Subsequently, it is discussed whether this obligation is ensured by reasoning (‘aql) or revelation (naql). Furthermore, while keeping in mind the role of intellect (nazar) and argumentation (istidlāl), we have established and evaluated religious state and source of nazar and (...) istidlāl. Also, we discussed to what extend God can be the subject of knowledge and from which aspects He can be known. Besides, we discussed whether ma‘rifatullah is an obligation and if not what its justification is. In addition, we examined whether imitative knowledge (taqlīd) is possible in the case of ma‘rifatullah or not and whether it’s sufficient to know God just by taqlīd without the reasoning at all. Finally, Qāḍī Abd al-Jābbār’s opinions on the religious situation of people to whom the divine revelation did not reach at all and so they lack of knowledge on God. (shrink)

It has long been suspected that attentional processes differ between olfaction and the other senses. Here, we test whether voluntary dishabituation, seen, for example, when we re-attend to the ticking of a clock, can occur in olfaction. Participants were seated in an odorized room, where at various intervals they had to evaluate what they could smell. An experimental group had one nostril open and the other closed, except during the evaluations, so that the closed side was subject to centrally driven (...) habituation, but not peripheral adaptation. A control group had both nostrils closed except during evaluations. Following exposure, the experimental group could not report the room's odor in either the centrally habituated nostril or the nostril that remained open, while the control group could. This effect could result from a number of causes, including olfaction's unique neuroanatomy, functional constraints imposed by detecting volatile chemicals, and as a consequence of limited cortical resources, with implications for the functional value of consciousness. (shrink)

The majority of the Sufi orders, which have their own special ezkar, evrâd, etiquette, and erkan and have survived until today, particularly VI/XII. They were formed over centuries and spread to many parts of the world by dividing into different branches in the historical process. Sufi personalities who belonged to these sufi orders established structures such as dervish lodges and dervish lodges in the regions they reached with great efforts, and they were instrumental in the conversion of many people to (...) Islam. Attributed to its founder, Abdulqadir Geylani, Qadiriyya is one of the most famous of these sufi orders. From the Middle East, especially from Iraq, to Afkaya; It spread over a wide area from Anatolia to the Balkans and China in the east and carried out convent activities with more than fifty branches. The Reshidiyya Sufi Order, which is attributed to Ahmed Reshidi and whose center is in Mosul, is a sect that operates in a wide region from Turkey to India and still has followers in these regions. It can be said that the Reshidiyya Sufi Order, which has its principles and manners, is one of the largest branches of the Qadiriyya. This Sufi order also has relations with the Rifaiyya, Bedewiyya, Desûqiyya, and Suhrawardiyya Sufi Order. Because Ahmed ar-Reshidi, the founder of the sect, is a Sufi figure who received the caliphate from all these sects. Although it is a Sufi order that has spread to this extent in Islamic lands and continues its dervish activities until today, the name of the Reshidiyya sect is not encountered even in the encyclopedic studies conducted in our country on the branches of the Qadiriyya Sufi Order. However, a scholar such as Mollâ Khalil Siirdî, who was mentioned as the "ser ring" in the ijazah ceremonies held in classical madrasahs that continued to be active in Anatolia until today, is one of the caliphs of this order. This humble study has been prepared by making use of the sources obtained through Ahmed ar-Reshidi's last-generation grandchildren after reaching them. With this study, we have been trained in recent times like Ahmed ar-Reshidi, Hz. We will try to introduce a great Sufi figure, who came from the progeny of the Prophet, who devoted his whole life to the task of guidance and who was referred to as the "pole", as well as the principles and manners of the Sufi order he was the founder of. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Modernity as Apocalypse: Sacred Nihilism and the Counterfeits of Logos by Thaddeus J. KozinskiMehmet CiftciModernity as Apocalypse: Sacred Nihilism and the Counterfeits of Logos by Thaddeus J. Kozinski (Brooklyn, NY: Angelico, 2019), 231 pp.Whether the names Adrian Vermeule, Fr. Edmund Waldstein, and Sohrab Ahmari provoke anxiety or glee in readers' minds will depend on where they stand on integralism, the brand of Catholic traditionalism that all three have (...) sought to promote through various websites and publications. Presenting themselves as the authentic interpreters of magisterial teachings on church–state relations, the integralists have challenged the long-standing attempt (especially in North America) to combine the Catholic faith with a commitment to political liberalism, natural rights, religious liberty, and state neutrality toward religion. For the integralists, attempting such a combination succeeds only in distorting the Catholic faith and causes us to forget what the Church taught before the Second Vatican Council, which still obliges the assent of Catholics, they claim, and is desperately needed to stand against the onward march of secularism. [End Page 966]Although Thaddeus Kozinski, former professor at Wyoming Catholic College, may not be one of the more well-known integralists, his latest book presents an interesting iteration of Catholic traditionalism that displays both what is valuable and what is most worrying about contemporary traditionalism. Kozinski's previous book was a closely argued critique of John Rawls and Jacques Maritain using the thought of Alasdair MacIntyre. It built up a cumulative case for the impossibility of resolving the political problem of religious pluralism without moving beyond philosophy by making a decision to reject or accept the political importance of the Catholic Church and its teachings.1 Although the author's preference for some sort of confessional state was already clear in that book, he preferred not to defend it, but rather to argue that it is impossible to be agnostic or neutral toward the ideal of church–state union. Now he goes on the offensive, presenting in the twenty brief chapters of Modernity as Apocalypse his "sundry attempts over the past decade to grapple with the question of modernity" (14). More precisely, he is grappling with the questions of what defines modernity, how we arrived at where we are, and what Christians should do while living in it, particularly in the fields of education and politics.The two chapters that form the first part (entitled "Modernity") use Charles Taylor's A Secular Age to argue that modernity's increasingly pluralistic and secular culture creates "an entirely new incapacity to experience the reality of a particular worldview in a naïve way, that is, without the consciousness of there being other viable options" (37). Yet the problem also reveals a blessing. "Encountering reality through the lens of other perennial traditions can serve to expose that false dichotomy in our minds that leads us to interpret other views as nothing more than full-fledged errors and our own personal lenses as nothing less than the whole truth" (21). Anyone who has read what passes for commentary on websites such as Church Militant or Rorate Caeli will find that statement surprising and refreshing.The second part ("Logos") contains four chapters that lucidly discuss contemporary disagreements in ethics between Kantians and virtue-ethicists, between new natural lawyers and MacIntyreans. Chapter 4 makes an effective and moving argument to read Plato "as a precursor to Faith, and a guide along the way home" (50). There are some brief but suggestive remarks drawing on Benedict XVI's Caritas in Veritate in [End Page 967] chapter 6 to argue that an ethics of gift can enable us to express the moral teachings of the New Testament in terms that are potentially convincing to a broader audience. "Metanoia" is the title of the third part, dedicated to education. Chapters 7–8 and 10 give not very original and yet timely arguments for the importance of the liberal arts, the need for Catholic universities to be institutions that can foster, rather than deform, the practice of philosophy, and the need for pedagogy to be rooted in the transmission of a community's tradition.2However, one cannot help but be startled when... (shrink)

This paper claims that a particular interpretation of Kant`s legal-political philosophy, as it is presented in his Doctrine of Right, provides us with the much needed resolution to the question of the normativity of law, precisely because it brings in a perspective that avoids both positivism and ethicism. This particular interpretation follows a strategy of argumentation that I call the “argument for the intrinsic normativity of law”, i.e., the argument that law is defined and justified on its own grounds, without (...) any need to refer to ethics, or rational/enlightened self-interest. This argument highlights the concept of legal person with the innate right to freedom as the necessary presupposition of legal practices, and sets forth a fundamental sense of justice inherent to the concept of law that consists in the reciprocal recognition of legal personality. In the end, I come up with a distinctive conception of law that I formulate as a last resort of normativity in the face of a conflict wherein an ethical solution does not appeal to all parties. (shrink)